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Abstract: A conflict exists between field biologists and physiologists (“functional biologists” or 
“evolutionary ecologists”) on the one hand and those working in molecular evolution (“evolutionary 
biologists” or “population geneticists”) on the other concerns the relative importance of natural 
selection and genetic drift. This paper is concerned with this issue in the case of vertebrates such as  
birds, fishes, mammals, and specifically humans, and views the issue in that context from a multilevel 
perspective. It proposes that the resolution is that adaptive selection outcomes occurring at the 
organism level chain down to determine outcomes at the genome level. The multiple realizability of 
higher level processes at lower levels then causes the adaptive nature of such processes at the 
organism level to be largely hidden at the genomic level. The discussion is further related to the 
“negative view” of selection, the Evo-Devo and Extended Evolutionary Synthesis views, and the levels 
of selection debate, where processes at the population level can also chain down in a similar way. 
 
1: Introduction 
There are currently a number of unresolved major controversies in evolutionary theory. Apart from 
the ongoing conflict about sociobiology, evolutionary psychology, and all that, which I will not 
discuss here,2 these include, 
 
1. Drift/selection: A conflict between field biologists and physiologists (“functional biologists” 
or “evolutionary ecologists”) on the one hand, and those working in molecular evolution 
(“evolutionary biologists” or “population geneticists”) on the other (Mayr 1961, Birch 2016), 
with the latter (e.g. Lynch 2007) vehemently claiming that drift is almost always more 
important than selection (at least at the molecular level). 
2. The “negative view” suggesting selection cannot explain the origin of traits (Stegmann 2010, 
Birch 2012); 
3. Evo-devo/the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES) versus Standard Evolutionary 
Theory (SET), as discussed by Laland, Uller, et al (2014) in debate with Wray et al (2014); 
4. The levels of selection issue:  can selection take place at the population level? (Lewontin 
1970, Okasha 2006). This is the kin selection/inclusive fitness vs group selection/multilevel 
selection debate (Birch and Okasha 2015, Wade et al 2010, Kramer and Meunier 2016). 
 
My main concern in this paper is the first conflict, which is evident particularly in polemical blogs 
such as those by P Z Myers (e.g. Myers 2014) and L Moran (e.g. Moran 2016), in opposition to views 
held by virtually all functional biologists. The two views on the relative importance of selection and 
drift result in a strange contrast. Books such as the major biology text by Campbell and Reece (2005) 
take it for granted that natural selection leads to adaptation to the environment, as does the animal 
physiology text by Randall et al (2007), the psychology text by Gray (2011), and the ground-breaking 
book Arrival of the Fittest by Wagner (2017). A typical quote is  
 
``The physiology of an animal is usually very well adapted to the environment that the  
animal occupies, thereby contributing to its  survival. Evolution by natural selection is the 
accepted  explanation for this condition, called  adaptation. .. A physiological process is 
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adaptive if it is present at high frequency in the population because it results in a higher  
probability of survival and reproduction than  alternative processes'' (Randall et al 2002:7) 
 
Similar statements will be found in each of the above books, and in texts on evolutionary theory such 
as by Mayr (2002) and Kampourakis (2014). In an interview in 1999,3 Mayr stated  
 
“Darwin showed very clearly that you don't need Aristotle's teleology because natural 
selection applied to bio-populations of unique phenomena can explain all the puzzling 
phenomena for which previously the mysterious process of teleology had been invoked”. 
 
By Contrast, Lynch writes in the preface to his major book The Origins of Genome Architecture 
(Lynch 2007: xiii-xiv, quoted in Moran 2016): 
 
Contrary to popular belief, evolution is not driven by natural selection alone. Many aspects of 
evolutionary change are indeed facilitated by natural selection, but all populations are 
influenced by non-adaptive forces of mutation, recombination, and random genetic drift. 
These additional forces are not simple embellishments around a primary axis of selection, but 
are quite the opposite—they dictate what natural selection can and cannot do … A central 
point to be explained in this book is that most aspects of evolution at the genome level cannot 
be fully explained in adaptive terms, and moreover, that many features could not have 
emerged without a near-complete disengagement of the power of natural selection. This 
contention is supported by a wide array of comparative data, as well as by well-established 
principles of population genetics” [my emphasis], 
 
and see also Lynch (2007a). Similarly Myers (2014) states  
 
“First thing you have to know: the revolution is over. Neutral and nearly neutral theory won. 
The neutral theory states that most of the variation found in evolutionary lineages is a 
product of random genetic drift. Nearly neutral theory is an expansion of the idea that 
basically says that even slightly advantageous or deleterious mutations will escape selection 
— they’ll be overwhelmed by effects dependent on population size. This does not in any way 
imply that selection is unimportant, but only that most molecular differences will not be a 
product of adaptive, selective changes” [my emphasis]. 
 
For skeptical responses to Lynch’s book, see Pigliucci (2011) and Charlesworth (2008). The question 
is, how there can be a compatibility between these two strongly held views? If most of the variation 
found in evolutionary lineages is a product of random genetic drift, how does apparent design arise? It 
surely can’t be an accidental by-product of random events – that was the whole point of Darwin’s 
momentous discovery (Darwin 1872) of a mechanism to explain apparent design that is so apparent in 
all of nature (Mayr 1961,2002). On the face of it, Lynch, Myers, and Moran seem to be saying the ID 
people are right: evolution cannot adapt life to its environment, because random effects dominate.  
 
This paper proposes that in order to reconcile these apparently opposing views, one must look at the 
issue explicitly in the light of the levels of emergence involved; that is, this issue cannot be resolved 
separately from the multilevel debate. Figure 1 shows the broadest relevant levels: the level of genes 
L1, the level or organisms L2, the level of populations L3, and the environment level L4. Basically in 
the end there are three types of multilevel relations to be considered: ML1, that between the organism 
and gene; ML2, that between the population and the organism, and ML3: that between the 
environment and the population. How does selection relate to these levels?  Note that as stated in the 
abstract, the specific concern of this paper is cases such as finches, fishes, giraffes, vertebrates in 
general, and particularly humans. All the studies of evolutionary processes in wheat, C elegans, 
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Drosophila, and so on provide important information on the processes at work, but do not deal with 
the full complexity of what happens in the cases of vertebrates in general, and in particular animals 
with complex social structures.   
 
The proposal here, as explicated below, is that selection takes place at either the individual level L2 
(Section 3) or population level L3 (Section 5), and this outcome then chains down to the level L1 of 
gene regulatory networks, genes, and proteins. Indeed that must be how individuals and populations 
get adapted to the environment; as otherwise such adaptation is unexplained. Because both RNA and 
the proteins involved in gene regulatory networks as well as all other proteins needed in the cell are 
encoded by DNA, in effect an image of the environment is imbodied in the genome (Stone 2015:188). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  The broad levels involved in evolutionary selection. Bottom up emergence BU1, BU2, 
BU3 and top-down effects TD4, TD3 and TD1 all occur, as discussed in this note.4 More detailed 
diagrams of relevant effects are given below; the total set of interactions is summarised in Figure 7. 
 
 
Between L3 and E one has the issue of niche construction (Laland et al 2000). Between L2 and L3 
one has the kin and multilevel selection debate proper (Wade at el 2010, Birch and Okasha 2015, 
Kramer and Meunier 2016). Between L1 and L2 one has the contrast of the view from population 
genetics involving genetic drift at level L1 (Lynch 2007, 2007a) versus the view from field biology 
and physiology at level L2 (Rhoades and Pflanzer 1989, Randall et al 2002, Campbell and Reece 
2005). It will be the contention of this paper, in agreement with Schaffner (1998), Martinez and Moya 
(2011) and Noble (2017), first that it is crucial to look at these opposing views in a multi-level context 
(Figures 1-7),  and second that as well as bottom-up emergence BU1, BU2 and BU3 between these 
levels, there are also top-down effects TD4, TD3 and TD1 occurring between them4 that crucially 
shape outcomes (Noble 2008, 2009, 2012, 2016, Ellis et al 2012, Ellis 2016). In a nutshell, selection 
effects are clear at levels L2 or L3, because that is where they usually occur, but are somewhat hidden 
at level L1, because that is almost always not the level at which they occur. Such effects can indeed 
explain apparent design at level L2: the Darwinian project is not undermined by population genetics.  
 
The stage for the discussion is set in Section 2 by considering the relation between structure, function, 
and traits. The drift/selection issue is discussed in Section 3 in terms of the relation between L1 and 
L2. This section also looks at the “negative view” of selection.  Section 4 gives a more complex view 
of the relations involved as proposed by Evo-Devo and “Extended Evolutionary Synthesis” (EES) 
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views of these processes, while Section 5 considers the multilevel selection issues as normally 
understood:  that is, the relation of L2 and L3 to each other and to L4.  The overall pattern of 
causation emerging, and its relation to the EES, is discussed in Section 6.  
 
2: Structure, Function, and Traits 
 
As a preliminary, one must ask what kind of things might be selected for: are they structures, 
functions, traits, or what? In studies of physiology (Rhoades and Pflanzer 1989, Randall et al 2002) 
and integrated views of biology (Campbell and Reece 2005), these are intimately intertwined  
 
One cannot sensibly talk about physiology of living systems without talking about function or 
purpose: the heart exists in order to circulate blood (Randall et al 2002:476-510), pacemaking cells  
exist in order to determine the rhythm of the  heart (Noble 2002), blood exists in order to transport  
oxygen, a key function of mitochondria in eukaryotes is to provide energy to the cell by converting 
ingested sugars into ATP (Randall et al 2002:74), and so on (Rhoades and Pflanzer 1989). Thus in 
Animal Physiology, Randall et al (2002:3,6) write  
 
Animal physiology focuses on the functions of tissues, organs, and organ systems in 
multicellular animals... Function flows from structure... A strong relationship between 
structure and function occurs at all levels of biological organisation.''  
 
Functional talk in biology is usually taken to be vindicated by Darwinism, as discussed inter alia by 
Ernst Mayr (2002,2004) and Kampourakis (2014).  According to Kampourakis,  
 
``Function is the role  of a component in the organization of a  system. The functions of the 
parts and  activities of organisms in enabling their  continued existence are ``biological 
functions'' or ``biological roles'' (the  function of the wing of an eagle is to enable  flight, but 
the function of the wing of a  penguin is enabling swimming)''  (Kampourakis 2014:221)  
 
A more formal related definition is given by Farnsworth et al (2017). According to Godfrey-Smith 
(1994), supported by Birch (2017:22),    
 
``Biological functions are dispositions or  effects a trait has which explain the recent 
maintenance of the trait under natural  selection''.   
 
According to Randall et al,  
 
``The physiology of an animal is usually very well adapted to the environment that the  
animal occupies, thereby contributing to its  survival. Evolution by natural selection is the 
accepted  explanation for this condition, called  adaptation. .. A physiological process is 
adaptive if it is present at high frequency in the  population because it results in a higher  
probability of survival and reproduction than  alternative processes'' (Randall et al  2002:7). 
 
In this note, following Godfrey-Smith(1994), Mayr (2002, 2004), Kampourakis (2014), Noble (2017), 
and Birch (2017), the view is as follows:  
 
The function α of a trait A, or of a physiological system S that enables A, exists in 
individuals in a population because having property α tends to increase differential  
reproduction and survival rates for a population of these individuals, and so  natural selection 
(Darwin 1872)  is a mechanism for developing property  α over recent evolutionary 
timescales, resulting in genotypes X that will  lead to existence of property α  in  individuals 
through contextual developmental  processes.  Selection takes place simultaneously for the 
function, trait, and underlying physiological systems that enable them.  
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Thus proper function of a trait is the effect for which it was selected by natural selection (Neander 
1991). Note that this is a definition at level L2. Farnsworth et al (2017).show how this then leads to a 
definition of function at a lower level: 
 
A biological function is a process enacted by a biological system A at emergent level n 
which influences one or more processes of a system B at level n + 1, of which A is a 
component part 
 
This defines function at level L1 from that at level L2 if we set n = 1. 
 
3: Drift and level of selection 
 
The drift controversy about the nature of biological evolution is due to the way many evolutionary 
theorists work essentially at the genetic level, where it is claimed that selection plays a minor role in 
what is going on. But for the multicellular organisms which are the concern of this paper, selection 
has no handle whereby it can directly effect what happens at the gene level (Mayr 2002, Martinez and 
Moya 2011).  Rather, selection takes place at the organism level,5 due to whether they survive or die 
before they have had time to reproduce, that selection then chaining down to the genotype level 
(organisms that survive pass on their genes to the next generation).  
 
This is indicated in Figure 2, where the main chain of causation is indicated by the yellow arrows. The 
overall effect (Natural Selection, NS) is necessarily a multi-level process.  
 
The currency of selection is expected lifetime reproduction success (total number of offspring 
surviving to reproductive stage). This is the reproductive potential: expected reproduction rate / 
expected mortality rate, as used in life-history optimisation. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 2: The basic causal chain whereby selection leads to a new set of genes. The yellow arrows 
with dark edges show the causal mechanisms operating on the initial set of genes G, the light purple 
ones show the resultant effective outcomes. The blue arrows with dark edges show the top-down effect 
of environmental constraints on selection.  The selected genes SG form the starting point for the next 
round of selection. 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 Or possibly even at the population level (see Section 5) 
 L1: Selected    
    Genes SG 
TD1  
L2:  Organisms O 
 
BU1  
 L2: Selected 
 Organisms SO 
RV1 
  L1: Genes G 
 
BU1 
L4:  Environment E 
  L2: Varied  
Organisms VO 
VI 
TD2  
Selection S2 
Repeat R 
L4:  Environment E 
   L1: Varied Genes VG 
TD2  
6 
 
 
3.1 The basic multilevel process 
 
The genotype G at level L1 can specify either proteins or functional RNA, and leads through 
contextually dependent developmental processes BU1 to individual organisms O, which have to be of 
a kind permitted by the environment (e.g. they can only be oxygen-breathers if the atmosphere 
contains oxygen; this will be satisfied because of the previous rounds of selection).  This is the top-
down influence TD2. Replication with Variation RV1: G VG takes place at the genotype level in 
various ways; this is where much randomness enters.  The varied set of genes VG lead through the 
same developmental processes BU1 to a varied set of organisms VO at the phenotype level, with 
random variations. Selection S2: VO  SO then takes place at that level; variations may found to be 
neutral, deleterious, or advantageous in the environmental context E. A subset of organisms for which 
this variation is at least not too deleterious will survive, resulting in a selected set of individuals SO 
generally better suited to the environment E, or at least not too much worse adapted. This necessarily 
results in the survival only of a subset SG of the varied genes VG (because they are the genes 
embodied in the surviving organisms SO). This is the top-down process TD1 that determines SG, 
which are the basis for the start of the next round (Campbell 1974, Murphy and Brown 2005). 
Varying the environment E leads to different outcomes SO and SG of the whole process; this is the 
top-down effect TD2. Finally the repeat operation R uses the selected set of genes SG for the start of 
the next round of variation and selection. 
 
The overall process NS1 (“Natural Selection”) for one round at the genotype level is (see Figure 2), 
 
                            NS1: G SG = {RV1  BU1  S2  TD1}.                   (1) 
 
The overall outcome at the organism level L2 is a map O  SO, characterised by selection leading 
by and large to relatively improved adaptation to the environment E. The L2 selection process S2 (a 
projection operator, see Ellis and Kopel 2017) is the process by which individuals are culled leading 
to adaptive outcomes at level L2:  
   
                                            S2: VO SO      (2) 
 
leading to natural selection NS2 as seen at the organism level: 
 
                                             NS2: O  SO                                                              (3)  
 
If one looks only at the genotype level L1, one sees only the map  
 
                                              VG: G SG       (4) 
 
as the effective outcome, not directly characterised by selection but rather being an indirect result of 
selection (2) at the level L2, as indicated by (1). The process is no longer obviously adaptive because 
of the multiple realisability of phenotypes in terms of their underlying genotypes (Wagner 2017): 
there is a very large equivalence class of genes SG that can lead to the class of individuals SI that 
survive the selection process L2 and so pass their genes on to their progeny at the start of the next 
round. In general the selection process at level L2 does not lead to simple outcomes at level L1.  
 
Issues arise at each step in this causal chain (Neander 1988, Mayr 2002, Lynch 2007a, Birch 2012, 
Noble 2013, Birch 2013, Scholl and Pigliucci 2014, Laland, Uller, et al 2014, Noble et al 2014, Birch 
2016, 2018), as follows (see Figure 2): 
 
• Replication with Variation RV1 involves very complex processes (Kirkpatrick et al 2002, 
Lynch and Conery 2003, Lynch 2007, Noble et al 2014) of both genetic and epigenetic 
nature.  There is a delicate balance between not enough variation and too much variation 
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- at the genotype level, how does this variation take place? By mutation, recombination, 
gene duplication, and mobile genetic elements (lateral gene transfer including 
symbiogenesis) (Noble et al 2014)  
- as regards population genetics, the outcome  is affected by genetic drift , which is the 
change in the frequency of an allele in a population due to random sampling of organisms 
(Lynch 2007), see \S3.3 
- What is the role of chance? Is the process to some degree directional? (Laland Uller et 
al 2014, Noble and Noble 2017). This is a very controversial area, see \S4.3. 
• Developmental Processes  BU1 (West-Eberhard 1989, 2003, Oyama et al 2001,Pigliucci 
2010, Noble et al 2014,  Pigliucci 2017) are immensely complex processes  They involve  
- Self-assembly processes (Kauffman 1992, 1993) represented by Fitness Landscapes in 
Sequence Space, the NK Model of Rugged Fitness Landscapes, and the NK Model of 
Random Epistatic Interaction 
- They crucially involve Developmental Systems as actors (Oyama et al 2001, Carroll 
2005, Gjuvsland et al 2013, Noble 2008a,  Mattick 2012,  Noble et al 2014). This key 
feature is discussed in Section 4.1, leading to the more complex view in Figure 4.   
- Developmental bias: these processes generate certain forms more readily than others 
(Laland Uller et al 2014, Laland et  al 2015), leading to convergent evolution (Conway 
Morris 2003, McGhee 2011). This is partly because only those organisms are possible, 
and partly because it is easier to generate some forms than others.  
- Developmental plasticity (West-Eberhard 1989, 2993) also occurs: an environmental 
sensitivity through epigenetic effects (Gilbert and Epel 2009, Noble 2015) mediated by 
gene regulatory networks (Carroll 2008), see \S4.1. This is a crucial effect. 
• Physiology L2: what can arise is limited by what is physiologically possible (Noble 2013). 
- Convergent evolution (Conway Morris 2003, McGhee 2011) is a consequence: 
evolution seeks out the limited sets of possible ways to solve functional problems. 
- These are related to contextual constraints set by the current environmental context E, 
see e.g. Ballance (2016), Wagner (2017), Godfrey-Smith (2017) for specific examples. 
This is thus the constraining nature of the environment TD2. 
• Selection S deletes unsuccessful individuals in a population, with result they die without 
reproduction. The outcome is the restriction V0 SO of varied organisms to selected ones 
that successfully reproduce, which thereby alters both the composition of the population (the 
bottom up effect BU2 in Figure 5) and of the gene pool (the top down effect TD1). This is the 
way that a more ordered population SO is generated at level L2 from the varied population 
VO, in general more suited to the environment, or at least no less fit. 
- Selection at the lower levels by this means is in fact for developmental systems and the 
molecules they require to function, not for genes per se (Oyama et al 2001, Pigliucci 
2010, Wagner 2017).  This is a crucial feature, see \S4.1 
- Contextual effects TD2 govern selection: the environment creates niches that define 
what is possible and so govern selection outcomes. Different environment result in 
different organisms being possible (Ballance 2016, Godfrey-Smith 2017, Wagner 2017) 
- The most accurate way to describe these effects is via a “norm of reaction” approach 
(Lewontin 1995) which is “ list or graph of the correspondence between different possible 
environments and the phenotypes which would result” (Schaffner 1998) 
• Realisation at cell and molecular level TD1: selection chains down from the selected 
organisms to the level of developmental systems and the needed DNA, RNA and proteins for 
them to function  (Petsko and  Ringe 2009, Wagner 2017, Ellis and Kopel 2017).  
- This is the top-down realisation TD1 of selection S2 occurring at level L2, to level L1. 
- A key feature here is the multiple realisability of phenotypes in terms of genotypes 
(Wagner 2011, 2017). This is discussed in \S3.4   
Apart from epigenetic effects, dealt with in Section 4, three crucial issues arise in these processes: 
population effects leading to drift  (\S3.2), multiple realisability (\S3.3), and existence of many more 
levels (\S3.4). The negative view is discussed in \S3.5, and the overall outcome in \S3.6. 
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3.2 Population effects: drift 
 
The diagrams do not attempt to represent the relation of the individuals to the populations they belong 
to. There is a huge literature on this relationship (see Lynch 2007, Birch 2013, Birch and Okasha 
2015, Kramer and Meunier 2016, Okasha 2016, Walsh et al 2017, Birch 2018, and references therein), 
which is key because selection acts on populations through its effects on individuals: it can’t act on a 
population per se (Martinez and Moya 2011). It acts at level L2 through survival of individuals and 
then chains up to L3 and down to L1, see Figure 1. Thus one must deal with explanation of traits of 
individuals as well as the distribution of traits in a population (Neander 1988). This relationship is the 
source of the level of selection issue, see Section 5, and of genetic drift, as discussed by Lynch 
(2007). 
 
Meaning of Drift: Pigliucci states (Pigliucci 2012),  “Drift has to do with stochastic events in 
generation-to-generation population sampling of gametes The strength of drift is inversely 
proportional to population size, which also means it has an antagonistic effect to natural selection 
(whose strength is directly proportional to population size). This leads to the drift-barrier for mutation 
rate evolution (Lynch et al 2016) and so to the views on the relation between drift and selection 
quoted in Section 1.  
 
Drift is not a physical process in individual genes or organisms, but a statistical property of 
populations, and so is not strictly a causal effect (Millstein et al 2009, Matthen 2010, Lange 2013): it 
is analogous to kinematic rather than dynamical effects in physics. It is a result that necessarily 
follows from statistical relations, if one assumes the nature of the statistical process: usually that each 
copy of the gene in the new generation is drawn randomly and independently from the genes in the 
previous generation. 
 
3.3 Multiple Realisability and Equivalence classes 
 
A key issue is the vast degeneracy of the genotype   phenotype map BU1, that is, the multiple 
realisability of phenotypes at level L2 via genotypes at level L1.  
 
This is a crucial property, labelled by Carroll (2008) as the functional equivalence of distant orthologs 
and paralogs. It is what makes a search of the genotype space possible in the time available since life 
began (Wagner 2011, 2017) because it underlies the fact the large genetic change can leave 
phenotypes unchanged while variation takes place, through whatever mechanism. This is what 
enables search of the `adjacent possible’ (Kauffman 1992, 1993) in the available time, as described in 
detail by Wagner. 
 
It then plays a key role in the top-down realisation TD1 of selection taking place at level L2 at level 
L1 as follows: a hallmark that top-down effects are occurring is when higher level entities or 
functions are realised via equivalence classes of lower level entities or functions (Pereboom and 
Kornblith 1991, Rickles 2006, Auletta et al 2008, Ellis 2016). It is this multiple realisability at lower 
levels of higher level structure and function that is at the core of emergence of irreducible new 
properties at higher levels (Rickles 2006, Ellis 2016, Bickle 2016, Jaworski 2018), because it is only 
at that higher level that the core causal pattern emerges. It is not possible to specify the action at a 
lower level in a way that reveals the causal patterns that drive what is happening; in philosophical 
terms, the attempt to do so results in descriptions that are not natural kinds (Murphy and Brown 2005; 
Fodor, see Bedau and Humphrey 2008:403-407; Ellis 2016:374).  
 
Descriptions that are natural kinds ( “The eagle swooped down in order to catch its prey”) emerge at 
higher levels. This higher level action is enabled by lower level causation shaped so as to result in the 
desired higher level action (in this case, flows of electrons in the eagle’s wing muscles).  Existence of 
equivalence classes of processes at the lower level (all the billions of different ways electrons can 
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flow in the eagle’s muscles to achieve the same result) characterise when top-down causation 
enabling higher level function is taking place (Auletta et al 2012, Ellis 2016).  
 
The same is true here of the top-down realisation TD1: the clear selection process at level L2 is 
masked at level L1 because it results in selection of equivalence classes of genotypes at that level, of 
which only one is realised in each selection event. 
 
3.4 Many more levels:  
 
There are many more levels of biological emergence than shown in Figure 2, which is a highly 
simplified representation of the real situation (Rhoades and Pflanzer 1989, Randall at al 2002, 
Campbell and Reece 2005. Noble 2012, Ellis 2016).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Top-down physiological effects. Levels of emergence and associated top-down 
physiological control effects that are important functionally and during development. They will 
necessarily lead to a corresponding chain of top down effects during evolutionary selection.  The 
cellular level is particularly important From Noble (2012), with permission, 
 
 
Figure 4 Indicates these levels. Both bottom up and top-down causation take place between each of 
these levels (Noble 2008, 2012, 2016, Ellis 2016), and what is represented in Figure 1 as a single top-
down process TD1 is in fact a chaining down of processes TD1n that takes place successively 
between many more levels L1n between level L1 and L2. The top-down chaining of physiological 
effects is indicated in Figure 3; consequent downward chaining of selection effects will necessarily 
also occur during evolution, as these are the links from higher level necessary functions (such as the 
beating of the heart) to lower level processes that enable this to happen (such as gene regulation in the 
heart, see Noble 2002, 2012) to the genes that enable those lower level processes. In Figure 4 we give 
a simplified representation of this chaining  through levels from L2 to L1 by including a level L1A of 
developmental systems (gene regulatory networks, metabolic networks, cell signalling networks) that 
is higher than the level L1 of genes and proteins, because it is this level that determines 
developmental outcomes BU1 through developmental processes as discussed in Section 4.1. 
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3.5 The negative view of natural selection and contrastive focus 
 
The negative view suggests selection cannot explain the origin of individual traits (Pust 2001, 
Stegmann 2010, Martinez and Moya 2011, Birch 2012). Birch expresses the issue this way: ”Can 
natural selection help explain why a particular organism has the traits it does? On the positive view of 
natural selection, it can: past selection for some trait can help explain why a later individual 
instantiates that trait. On the negative view of natural selection, it cannot: selection can explain the 
distribution and origin of trait types in a population, but it cannot explain the possession of any 
particular trait token by any particular individual .. [this]threatens to render inexplicable the 
adaptedness of an individual organism” Birch (2012). He responds by proposing a different criterion 
for explanatory relevance than implied by arguments for the negative view.   
 
Pust (2001) nicely discusses it as an issue of contrastive focus, as in essence do Birch (2012) and 
Martinez and Moya (2011). The latter state that on the negative view, “natural selection is considered 
as a merely negative process, fulfilling only the function of filtering and distributing the percentage of 
variants already existing in a population, which originated and were shaped by other biological 
means”. That is, the issue is if one focuses only on the selection step S2 at level L2 in Figure 2 (given 
by (2)), which is indeed a `negative process’ although one that creates order out of disorder (Ellis 
2016), or the entire multilevel process NS1 given by.(1) leading to the full selection process NS2 at 
level L2 given by (3), which is clearly a creative process (Darwin 1872, Mayr 2002, Carroll 2005).  
 
To see the full constructive process one must take a multilevel view (Figure 2) which includes the 
randomisation process RV1 leading to varied organisms VO (“Arrival of the Fittest”, Wagner 2017) 
which can then be selected from to attain greater functionality. This multilevel process is a case of 
downward causation (Campbell 1974, Martinez and Moya 2011, Ellis 2017).  
 
3.6 The overall result 
 
The overall effect is that lower level components are selected by evolution so as to be adapted to 
higher level functions (Campbell 1974, Murphy and Brown 2007: 65-70, Ellis 2016, Ellis and Kopel 
2017, Wagner 2017) as indicated in Figure2 and summarised in Eqns.(1)-(4). This provides an answer 
to the conundrum proposed in Section 1:  
 
Proposed Resolution: Adaptation through selection is clear at the phenotype level L2, where 
it actually takes place, even if it is not clear at the genotype Level L1, where the effects that 
occur are a consequent result of those higher order processes and selection TD1 takes place 
for equivalence classes of genes enabling higher level functions that are necessary for 
survival. 
 
This hierarchical structure is hidden if one takes a purely population genetics approach. The tensions 
noted by Birch (2016) are related to looking at the issue at these two different levels. For example, 
Natarajan et al (2016) show that the particular mutations in the different bird species living at high 
or low altitude seem to be random (or at least  not predictable), but they all correlate with the same 
functional change in the phenotype.  
 
4 Evo-Devo and the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis 
 
The assumption of a 1-1 genotype to phenotype map is wrong in both directions, leading to a variety 
of complications encompassed in the Evo-Devo viewpoint (Carroll 2005, 2008). This incorporates 
specifically the importance of developmental systems (\S 4.1) and associated epigenetic effects  
(\S 4.2). This is developed further in the proposal of an Extended Evolutionary Synthesis, or ESS 
(Pigliucci and Müller 2010, c 2014, Laland et al 2015, Bateson et al 2017, Noble and Noble 2017), focusing 
on developmental bias, developmental plasticity, extra-genetic inheritance, and niche construction.  
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A key issue here is to what degree variational processes are random, given that developmental 
processes generate certain forms more readily than others (\S 4.3) Again many levels of emergence 
are involved, and this is discussed in the next section (Section 5), where inter alia the issue of niche 
construction is considered (\S 5.3).6 
 
4.1 Evo-Devo Effects  
 
The key point at issue here is that organisms are not generated by genes per se, but by developmental 
systems that determine what genes will get turned on when and where via epigenetic processes 
(Oyama et al 2001, Carroll 2008, Noble 2008, Gilbert and Epel 2009, Noble 2012, 2016). As traits are 
determined by such systems, when selection chains down from the organism level to the gene level 
(see Figure 2), it does so via the developmental systems level and specifically via Gene Regulatory 
Networks (GRNs), which therefore are a key target of selection. Consequently, we need as a 
minimum7 to introduce a new level L1A of GRNs into Figure 2, leading to Figure 4. This is how 
developmental processes influence evolutionary processes, hence the label “Evo-Devo”. One can 
think of the GRH level as a proxy for the crucial cellular level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: The causal chain whereby selection leads to a new set of genes: gene regulatory 
networks.  Extension of Figure 2 to take Evo-Devo effects into account. Not shown is the effect of 
individuals and the group on the environment (niche construction), see Figure 6. 
 
 
In more detail: Alberch (1991) introduced the genotype-phenotype “mapping function” G P  which 
is much  more complex than a one-to-one relation between genotype and phenotype (Gjuvsland et al 
2013): the same phenotype may be obtained from different combinations of genetic informational 
resources (Pigliucci 2010) because of environmental plasticity (West Eberhard 1989, 2003),  leading 
to Mosaic Pleiotropy (Carroll 2008), developmental bias, and developmental plasticity. The key 
                                                          
6 A further controversy arising in this broad context is the issue of whether there actually exists “junk DNA” or 
not (see e.g. comments by Larry Moran in his blog). I will not touch on that debate here.  
7 In principle, one should include all the levels shown in Figure 3 – but this would be very complex. Figure 4 is 
a workable compromise to illustrate the dynamical relations involved.  
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question in developmental biology is what feature determines which genes are switched on where and 
when. This is controlled by epigenetic processes involving positional information (Wolpert 2002, 
Gilbert 2006), physiological information (Noble 2002, 2008, 2016), cell signalling, epistasis (the 
interaction between genes: Cordell 2002, Phillips 2008), and gene-environment interactions 
(Kauffman 1993, Cooper and Podlick 2002, Gilbert and Epel 2009).  
 
The term “epigenetics” however is contested and used in a variety of ways. Bird (2007) suggests the 
following unifying definition of epigenetic events: the structural adaptation of chromosomal regions 
so as to register, signal or perpetuate altered activity states. These are features not directly governed 
by the genetic code but by the cellular context, and include DNA methylation, covalent modification 
of histone proteins (Jaenisch and Bird 2003), and RNA mediated DNA regulation (Mattick 2001, 
2012). They are enabled by Gene Regulatory Networks (Carroll 2008) which themselves are the 
product of developmental processes based on the genes coding for their proteins. These are key actors 
in what occurs (Carroll 2005, 2008, Mattick 2012, Noble 2008a, Noble et al 2014), and are also 
selected in order to give the desired developmental results, leading to genetic inheritance processes.  
 
These multi-level evolutionary processes additionally select for metabolic networks, cell signalling 
networks, and proteins that enable the whole system to function (Wagner 2011, 2017). The basic 
structure is the same as Figure 2, but with new elements, see Figure 4. 
 
• The GRNs control the bottom-up developmental processes BU1 at each stage of the 
evolutionary cycle, that is first with the original genes G and then with the varied genes VG. 
This bottom-up process is indicated by the upward arrows in Figure 2. 
• Positional information within the developing embryo and then in the organism (Wolpert 2002, 
Gilbert 2006) controls which genes get switched on where and when during development by 
the top-down epigenetic processes TD1C, and again occurs at each stage of the evolutionary 
cycle. Additionally, physiological information gets feed down to the GRNs all the time as part 
of the normal physiological functioning of the organism (Nobel 2008, 2016). This 
corresponds to the downward arrows in Figure 2 and to TD1C in Figure 4. 
• Environmental factors influence this process by changing global parameters that then 
influence which genes get switched on and off (Carroll 2005, Gilbert and Epel 2009); this is 
the top-down process TD2A, again occurring at each stage of the developmental process. 
• The top-down process TD1C leads to preferentially selected gene regulatory networks 
SGRNs which in turn lead to selection of preferred genotypes; that is the top-down process 
TD1B, which turns this whole process into an inter-level feedback loop over time (West-
Eberhard 2003). 
• The principle of equivalence classes (\S3.4) still holds: there are a great many ways that the 
higher level needs can be realised by lower level processes, GRNs, and genotypes. 
 
Two interacting opposing elements enter here: 
• Developmental bias (Maynard Smith et al 1985, Kauffman 1992, 1993) in the process BU1 
tends to channel development independent of the environment and leads to evolutionary 
convergence (Conway Morris 2003, McGhee 2011) 
• Developmental Plasticity tends to channel development in response to environmental  
conditions via the process TD2A, channelling developmental outcomes as far as is allowed by 
developmental bias. Thus developmental outcomes respond to the environment, which is 
environmental plasticity (West Eberhard 1989, 2003)  
 
There is a robustness-evolvability tradeoff: mutations affecting regulatory networks must both 
generate variance but also be tolerated at the phenotype level (Masel and  Siegal 2009). Genotypes 
involving nonlinear dynamics allow expression levels to be robust to small perturbations, while 
generating high diversity (evolvability) under larger perturbations. Thus, nonlinearity breaks the 
robustness-evolvability trade-off in gene expression levels by allowing disparate responses to 
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different mutations (Steinacher et al, 2016). This robustness promotes evolvability (Masel and Trotter 
2010), which is crucially enables by the huge degeneracy of the genotype to phenotype map  which 
allows exploration of genotype space in the time available since life began (Wagner 2011, 2017). 
 
4.2 Epigenetic Inheritance Processes:   
 
Organisms transmit more than genes across generations, namely as well as the genome, the next 
generation inherits all the basic cellular machinery that underlies cell function and sets the context for 
reading the genetic code (Alberts et al 2007, Hofmeyr 2017). Noble (2008a) states this as follows: 
“There are two components to molecular inheritance: the genome DNA, which can be viewed as 
digital information, and the cellular machinery, which can, perhaps by contrast, be viewed as 
analogue information. … The egg cell machinery is just as molecular as the DNA. .. Both are used to 
enable the organism to capture and build the new molecules that enable it to develop, but the process 
involves a coding step in the case of DNA and proteins, while no such step is involved in the rest of 
the molecular inheritance. This is the essential difference.”  
 
This may thus be referred to as Extra-genetic inheritance.  It can include the transmission of 
epigenetic marks (Bird 2002, Jaenisch and Bird 2003, Laland ,Uller, et al 2014, Noble et al 2014) 
because features such as DNA methylation and covalent modification of histone proteins can 
sometimes also be inherited and alter DNA expression, and can thereby influence fertility, longevity 
and disease resistance (Laland, Uller, et al 2014, Heard  and  Martienssen  2014). For a specific 
example see Hu and Albertson (2017).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: The causal chain whereby selection leads to a new set of genetic contexts: extragenetic 
inheritance.  Transmission of epigenetic effects to the next generation (here collectively labelled as 
“Epigenetic Marks” M) will alter the way genes are read and so affect developmental outcomes. 
 
 
Figure 5 attempts to indicate this. Epigenetic Marks M at level L0 lead to varied epigenetic marks 
VM in the next generation, which then affect reading of varied genes VG at level L1 and hence 
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developmental outcomes VO at level L2. The selection process VO SO will then chain down to 
lead to selection of both genes SG and epigenetic marks SM that tend to produce favourable 
outcomes at level L1. The selected epigenetic marks may or may not get passed on to the next 
generation (Dupont et al 2009); they may alternatively be “reset”, and so not be passed on. The degree 
to which this is important is the subject of ongoing debate (Richards et al 2010, Laland, Uller, et al 
2014, Wray et al 2014); Mattick (2012) suggests it is far more important than usually realised..  
 
The phrase “epigenetic inheritance” is also used to cover cultural inheritance, allowing niche 
construction: that is not represented here, and is discussed in \S5.3. 
 
4.3 Non-Random Variation 
 
As mentioned already, much variation is not random at the level L1 because developmental processes 
generate certain forms more readily than others (Kauffmann 1992, 1993, Laland Uller et al 2014). 
Such developmental bias can be regarded as a creative element leading to convergent evolution at that 
level (Conway Morris  2003, McGhee  2011, Laland, Uller, et al 2014). 
 
 However additionally, Noble and Noble (2017) point out that organisms and their interacting 
populations have evolved guided random mutational mechanisms (`hypermutation’, Odegard and 
Schatz 2006) by which they can harness blind stochasticity and so generate rapid functional responses 
to environmental challenges by re-organising their genomes and/or their regulatory networks. 
Epigenetic as well as DNA changes are involved, the key feature being specific targeting of the 
relevant part of the genome due to higher-level buffering by regulatory networks in addition to 
differential genome mutation rates. As stated by Noble and Noble, “the guidance does not lie at the 
genome level…. At the genome level the process appears blind, it depends on stochastic mutation. 
The functionality enabling the process to be described as guided lies in the system as a whole”. 
 
4.4 The Overall Effect 
 
The overall result of taking these additional effects into account is that the basic view put in the last 
section, summarised in Section 3.7 remains unchanged:  
 
The overall effect is that adaptation through selection is clear at the phenotype level L2, 
where it actually takes place, even if it is not clear at the genotype Level L1 (Figures 4 and 5) 
as summarised in Eqns. (1)-(4). 
 
Indeed that view is strengthened because the further mechanisms identified here lead to even larger 
equivalence classes at lower levels corresponding to higher level structures and functions.   
 
5 Multilevel selection, kin selection, and niche construction 
 
The above is of course a multi-level approach. But it has not touched on the vast literature around the 
issues of evolution of eusociality and altruism, and kin selection versus group selection: see Lewontin 
(1970), Maynard-Smith and Price (1973), Maynard Smith (1982), Alonso (1998), Okasha (2006), 
Wade et al (2010), Pigliucci (2010a) , Marshall (2011), Martinez and Moya (2011), Birch and Okasha 
(2015), Kramer and Meunier (2016),Birch (2018), and references therein.  
 
5.1 Multilevel Selection  The relevant emergent levels are displayed in Figure 6. From a macro-level 
causal viewpoint, there are two distinct things that can happen.  
 
• First, there are clear cases where individual organisms O at level L2 have higher survival 
value than other individual organisms in the ecosystem: they may be stronger or faster or able 
to fly or have better vision. Their preferential selection is the top-down effect TD2 to the 
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organism level. In those cases, a population P at level L3 comprised of such organisms will 
be more likely to survive than populations comprised of organisms that are less fit 
individually. Thus the upward emergence process BU2 then confers greater survival value on 
the population P at level L3. This effect (Walsh et al 2017) relies on linearity: the population 
is just the sum of its parts. That preferential survival value at the organism level L2 will chain 
down to the gene level L1 by the top-down process TD1, as before. 
 
• Second, when genuine emergence of higher level traits occur, populations are not just 
aggregates of lower level trains (Ellis 2013)8. There are clear cases where the whole is more 
than just the sum of its parts, and an emergent trait at the population level L3 has survival 
value for the population itself relative to other populations (Lehmann et al, 2007). This is the 
case for instance as regards development of social systems enabled by language, resulting in 
technology (weapons, transport, controlled energy use, and so on) that enhances survival and 
cannot be developed by individuals acting on their own. This can provide much greater 
survival value for the population P as a whole than if its constituent organisms just lived in 
the same area without the social interactions leading to these social innovations.  
 
This results in the top-down process of group selection TD4, leading in turn to enhanced survival 
rates for organisms O belonging to that group. This is the top-down process TD3 chaining selection 
down to level L2 from the enhanced group survival rates at level L3. As before, this will chain on 
down via the process TD1 to the level of developmental systems and genes.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6:  The broad levels involved in evolutionary selection between groups and individuals.   
The effects of the environment included. Not shown is the direct effect of the individual on the 
environment, because the group effect is so much larger. 
 
 
This is kin selection in the following sense: referring to Traulsen and Nowak (2006), Lehmann et al 
(2007) say “It is quite obvious that the mechanism that allows cooperation to evolve under T&N’s life 
cycle is kin selection; interactions occur within groups, and individuals from the same group are 
related (i.e., they share a more recent common ancestor than individuals sampled randomly from the 
                                                          
8 For a graphic demonstration of the protective advantage provided by emergence of the common purpose of a 
collective of buffalo, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LU8DDYz68kM. The whole is manifestly greater 
than the parts because it acts as a collective. 
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whole population). Hence, T&N’s model falls into the scope of Hamilton’s inclusive fitness theory,9 
which is a general method for analyzing selection”. This form of kin selection occurs in the multilevel 
context represented by Figure 6 through TD3 combined with TD1. 
 
5.2 Kin selection/inclusive fitness versus group selection/multilevel selection 
 
A key issue arises here: Why are altruistic individuals selected for, so promoting group survival  but 
usually at their own expense, rather than selfish individuals being selected for, because they promote 
their own welfare at the expense of the group? How does one deal with the Free Loader problem?  
This issue is often characterised as a tension between Kin selection, the preferential selection (at Level 
L2) because of inclusive fitness of individuals who happen to be related, and multilevel selection or 
group selection, which is preferential selection (at Level L3) of the group per se when “competition 
occurs between groups sensu stricto” (Lehmann et al 2007).   
Birch and Okasha (2015) state this as follows:  
 
Kin selection emphasizes the relatedness between social partners as the crucial factor 
mediating the spread of a prosocial behavior. Multilevel selection, in contrast, emphasizes 
the interplay of selection within groups and between groups … Within any group, altruists 
will be at a selective disadvantage vis á vis their selfish counterparts, but groups containing a 
high proportion of altruists may outcompete groups containing a lower proportion. So, for an 
altruistic behavior to spread, the between-group component of selection must trump the 
within-group component 
 
There is a large literature on the contest between within-group and intra-group selection, and which is 
most important in a particular context; for a summary, see Birch and Okasha (2015). Mathematically, 
this relates to Hamilton’s Theory (Hamilton 1964) and the Price equation (Price 1970). 
 
Hamilton’s Theory The theory of kin selection (Hamilton’s 1964) is the best-known framework for 
understanding the evolution of social behaviour. According to Birch and Okasha (2015),  
 
“The basic empirical prediction of kin selection theory is that social behavior should 
correlate with genetic relatedness; in particular, altruistic actions, which are costly to the 
actor but benefit others, are more likely to be directed toward relatives. This qualitative 
prediction has been amply confirmed in diverse taxa … But despite its empirical success, kin 
selection theory is not without its critics”.  
 
In fact major conflicts have raged around Hamilton’s equation.  Birch and Okasha (2015) claim that 
different protagonists in this conflict are using different versions of Hamilton’s rule. To resolve it, 
they propose distinguishing three versions of this rule: Special (HRS), general (HRG), and 
approximate (HRA). HRS is an exact result for any model with an additive payoff structure. It 
therefore cannot represent emergent properties, where the whole is more than the sum of the parts and 
so won’t represent group selection effects. HRG is an exact version of the rule that remains correct no 
matter how complicated the payoff structure may be, because all relevant payoff parameters are 
implicitly taken into account in the calculation of the costs and benefit; “we are abstracting away 
from the complex causal details of social interaction to focus on the overarching statistical 
relationship between genotype and fitness.” Debate about the usefulness of HRG is ongoing. HRA 
sacrifices a degree of this generality, relying on the idea that, when selection is weak and gene action 
is additive, a first-order approximation that neglects deviations from payoff additivity is justified   
When this is valid is clearly context dependent. This approximate version is the one most commonly 
used by kin selection theorists. But it does not obviously have a multilevel structure. 
 
                                                          
9 The Inclusive Fitness controversy is dealt with in Birch and Okasha (2013) and Birch (2018). 
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Kin selection = group selection??  Despite much contestation to the contrary, kin and multilevel 
selection are often regarded as equivalent The mathematical formalisms are the same (Lehmann at al 
2007, Marshall 2011, Wade et al 2010, Frank 2013, Birch and Okasha 2015, Kramer and  Meunier 
2016), the difference between the approaches  is simply a question of collecting terms in the Price 
equation in different ways. As stated by Birch and Okasha (2015),  
 
“In any group-structured population, the total evolutionary change can be decomposed using 
either the kin selection partition  or the multilevel partition. Moreover, it is easy to see that 
the kin selection criterion for the spread of a prosocial trait (rb > c) will be satisfied if and 
only if the multilevel criterion is satisfied (i.e., the covariance between groups is greater than 
that within groups). Therefore, the two approaches are formally equivalent. …. Evolutionary 
biology, as are other sciences, is interested in constructing causal explanations; ideally, we 
want our descriptions of evolutionary change to capture the causal structure of the 
underlying selection process, as well as correctly computing allele frequency change. So, 
although kin and multilevel selection may be formally equivalent, it does not follow that they 
are also equally good as causal representations.”  
 
The issue is which best represents the causal situation. That depends on context, and the context is the 
multilevel situation shown in Figure 6, together with the knowledge that group selection has indeed 
taken place in some contexts in the past. To look at this, I consider relevant causal mechanisms. 
 
5.3 Through what mechanisms does multilevel selection occur?  
 
There are basically two contrasting views on mechanisms underlying the social interactions that drive 
social evolution: the Selfish Individual Hypothesis and the Social Brain Hypothesis. 
 
The Selfish Individual hypothesis: The assumption underlying much evolutionary analyses is the 
assumption of standard economics that individuals will always behave in a selfish way. For example 
Lewontin (1970) writes,   
 
“In a regulated population it is clearly advantageous for a single individual to depart from 
cooperative behavior, just as it is advantageous for the single depositor to run to the bank in 
the economic analogy”.  
 
This understanding is formalised in Evolutionary game theory (Maynard Smith and Price 1973, 
Maynard Smith 1982).10 But that view is based on a rational expectations model of selfish behaviour – 
the standard economics assumption - that is not a realistic characterisation of how most people 
actually behave in society. It may possibly represent laboratory results where real-world complexities 
such as social obligations have been removed in order to get replicable results. But in fact families 
exist, social communities exist, and kindness and courtesy are common in the real world,  
 
The Social Brain hypothesis, that the large brains of primates reflect the computational demands of 
their complex social systems (Dunbar 1998, 2003, 2014), is supported by much data. It assumes that 
primates and specifically humans mainly live communally in social groups instead of being scattered 
around as hermits – which indeed they do. This structuring is because at the population level, coherent 
social groups, with language and developed technology as well as community spirit, have a major 
competitive advantage over mere aggregations of isolated individuals who cannot call on group 
resources to solve problems11. Selection therefore takes place for individuals at level L1 whose nature 
is such as to lead to existence of coherent social groups at level L2: the selective advantage of such 
groups at level L2 has chained down to so as to preferentially select individuals at level L1 with 
social brains (Dunbar 1998, 2003, 2014).  
                                                          
10 There is a good summary in Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evolutionary_game_theory. 
11 For a graphic example, see the barn raising video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y1CPO4R8o5M. 
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The undoubted existence of social groups in the animal kingdom is direct evidence for selection at the 
group level L2 for such coherent social groups. Chaining down to the individual level L1, there is 
preferential selection for individuals at that level who tend to create emergent groups at level L2.  
This requires a social brain, preferring living in social groups where cooperation takes place. 
 
Is there a biological mechanism that leads to a social brain?  Sober and Sloan Wilson (1998) 
discuss the evolution and psychology of unselfish behaviour, proposing mechanisms of psychological 
altruism. The view I propose is that some of the innate primary affective systems (Panksepp 1998, 
Panksepp and Biven 2012, Ellis and Solms 2018) have been developed precisely in order to lead to 
group formation and stabilisation. Specifically (Stevens  and Price 2000, Toronchuk and Ellis 2012): 
• A primary emotional system that makes us strongly wish to belong to a group and feel 
allegiance to it, and so underlies the social brain and a tendency to share resources, and  
• A ranking/dominance primary emotional system that regulates group conflict about resource 
sharing once a group has formed. 
 
Nature has found it so important for survival that these innate mechanisms have been developed 
through evolutionary processes to strengthen the cooperation of individuals in societies. That is, they 
exist because of top-down selection from the group level L3 to the level L2 of individuals who have 
these traits, to the level L1 of genetic and developmental systems that will ensure that they exist (Ellis 
and Solms 2017).  Furthermore, they are reinforced by  
• Social norms establishing what is acceptable in a society, reinforced by punishment (Boyd 
and Richerson 1992) 
• Secondary emotions such as guilt and shame that strongly reinforce holding to the established 
social norms of a society.  
 
Together these mechanisms largely negate the kind of logic represented by the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
and similar analyses of social interactions. Dunbar’s ideas are well supported by evidence, and should 
be taken as important pointers to what is really going on:  
 
The social brain and social groups: humans and other higher animals do indeed have social 
brains, and have been selected to have them because they make possible major benefits arising 
from living in coherent social groups. This can only happen by  multilevel selection from the 
group level down to the individual level and then down to the development systems level.  
 
5.4 Niche construction BU3  
 
Niche construction effects BU3 are all the processes whereby organisms alter the environment 
(Laland et al 2000, O’Brien and Laland 2012, Laland, Odling Smee and Turner 2014), so altering the 
selective context within which evolutionary processes take place. Thus this in turn affects the top-
down processes TD4 and TD2.  
 
How important is this? It is crucial in some cases, for example. the Great Oxygenation event that 
transformed the Earth’s atmosphere (Margulis and Sagan 1986). The development of  agriculture is a 
key example of niche construction on the part of human beings (Laland et al 2000, Laland 2017). It 
also encompasses those structures and altered conditions that organisms leave to their descendants 
through their niche construction (Laland, Uller, et al 2014) — from beavers’ dams to worm-processed 
soils to cities, technology (machine tools, computer systems, etc), and global climate change. 
 
5.5 Many more levels, and Major Evolutionary Transitions 
 
As mentioned in the previous sections, there are in fact many more levels of organisation than shown 
in Figure 6. This is indicated in Figure 3. Selective choice has chained down between all these levels, 
so that the lower level developmental systems will reliably lead to the simultaneous existence of each 
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of the higher levels. This is necessary in order that they exist, as they demonstrably do (Rhoades and 
Pflanzer 1989, Randall et al 2002, Campbell and Reece 2005).  A key feature then arises: how did 
these levels come into existence over the course of evolutionary history? 
 
Major evolutionary transitions: Natural selection has led to the emergence of new levels of 
structure during evolutionary history (Maynard Smith and  Szathmáry 1995, Calcott and Sterelny 
2011, Szathmáry 2015), e.g. 
• The emergence of Eukaryotes from Prokaryotes, after which mitochondria and chloroplasts 
can only replicate within a host cell;  
• The emergence of multicellular organisms from single cell organisms, after which the 
relevant single cells are no longer viable as entities on their own;  
• The origin of sex, after which organisms can only replicate as part of a sexual population;  
• The origin of social groups, so that individual organisms such as ants, bees, wasps and 
termites can survive and pass on their genes only as part of a social group; 
• The origin of human culture (Boyd and Richerson 1985, 2005), with symbolic systems such 
as language allowing emergence of social structures and technology that vastly increased 
competitive advantage vis a vis other groups.  
This could not happen unless the evolutionary selective processes acting favoured emergence of the 
new higher levels, and then systematically acted downward from this higher level to the level of 
developmental processes that lead to its existence. Such emergence faces the same issue of within 
group and between group selection as discussed above (\S5.2):  
 
“Why did not natural selection acting on entities at the lower level (replicating molecules, free-
living prokaryotes, asexual protists, single cells, individual organisms) disrupt integration at the 
higher level (chromosomes, eukaryotic cells, sexual species, multicellular organisms, societies)? 
(Maynard Smith and  Szathmáry 1995:7)  
 
Maynard Smith and  Szathmáry (1995:8-10) see this as solved by 
• Immediate selective advantage to individual replicators at the genetic level with a high 
degree of genetic relatedness between the units that combine in the higher organism. This is 
Hamilton’s principle of kin selection. 
• Contingent irreversibility: a ratchet effect whereby if an entity has replicated as part of a 
larger whole for a long time, it may have lost the capacity for independent replication it once 
had, for accidental reasons that have little to do with the evolution of the higher level entity in 
the first place 
• Central control: the maintenance of organisations depends on some kind of central control. 
This is the principle of top-down causation discussed in Noble (2008,2012,2016) and Ellis 
(2012, 2016).   
It leads to 
• The division of labour, whereby an initially identical set of objects becomes differentiated 
and functionally specialised (the principle of modularity: Ellis 2016), which happened 
through developmental processes that have been selected for by evolution (Maynard Smith 
and  Szathmáry 1995:12-13) 
• New ways of transmitting information, including the origin of the genetic code, the origin 
of translation and encoded protein synthesis, the evolution of epigenetic inheritance with 
unlimited heredity leading to the emergences of plants, animals, and fungi, and the evolution 
of human language with unlimited semantic representation (Maynard Smith and  
Szathmáry 1995:13-14). 
 
All of this involves top-down causation as indicated in Figure 6. As stated by Walker et al, 
 
“Here we propose that a transition from bottom-up to top-down causation – mediated by a 
reversal in the flow of information from lower to higher levels of organization, to that from 
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higher to lower levels of organization – is a driving force for most major evolutionary 
transitions. We suggest that many major evolutionary transitions might therefore be marked 
by a transition in causal structure” (Walker et al 2012). 
 
That is, whatever theories of competition within and between populations may say, it is a historical 
fact that higher levels of organisation have indeed emerged. This is only possible if top-down 
selective processes take place that lead to emergence of the new higher level. This cannot be captured 
by any equations that refer to a fixed number of levels. These crucial causal processes are hidden by 
any approach that implies the genotype level alone is the key to what is going on.     
 
5.6 The overall effect 
 
The outcome of the view put here is that  
 
The overall result: One cannot adequately understand the processes in operation in 
evolutionary selection without taking a multi-level viewpoint (Figure 6). One can then discuss 
within that framework whether BU2: individual selection chaining up to the group level, or 
TD3: group selection chaining down to the individual level, are more important in specific 
cases. Both are important in different circumstances. In particular, selection at the group 
level is the key process leading to emergence of novelty during the evolutionary process 
 
Any equations used to describe these processes must be adequate to represent these multi-level 
processes and options. If they do not do so, they must be replaced by more adequate equations. 
 
6: The process as a whole: relation to controversies  
 
Martinez and Moya (2011) state 
 
In this paper, using a multilevel approach, we defend the positive role of natural selection in 
the generation of organismal form. Despite the currently widespread opinion that natural 
selection only plays a negative role in the evolution of form, we argue, in contrast, that the 
Darwinian factor is a crucial (but not exclusive) factor in morphological organization. 
Analyzing some classic arguments, we propose incorporating the notion of ‘downward 
causation’ into the concept of ‘natural selection.’ In our opinion, this kind of causation is 
fundamental to the operation of selection as a creative evolutionary process  
 
This paper supports that view. Stochasticity at lower levels is harnessed by organisms to generate 
functionality: the order originates at higher levels, which constrain the components at lower levels 
(Noble 2017). A view focused primarily on genes will miss this causal structure.  
 
6.1 The process as a whole 
 
Schaffner (1998) illuminatingly discusses the relevant issues, phrasing them in terms of eleven theses,  
supported by many references, as follows: 
 
(1) The nature-nurture distinction is outmoded and needs to be replaced by a seamless 
unification approach in which genes and environment are "interacting and inseparable 
shapers of development." 
(2) The relation between genes and organisms is "many-many" and the existence of 
significant "developmental noise" (chance events during development) precludes both 
gene-to-organism trait predictability (including behavioral traits) and organism trait-to-
gene inferences. Thus the outcome is emergent. 
(3) Genes do not "contain" the "information" that is a blueprint for traits, rather information 
discernible in maturing organisms develops the information is the product of an ontogeny. 
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(4) DNA sequences have no fixed meaning,but are informational only in context. 
(5) Characterizing genes as causes of traits reflects outmoded preformationist thinking. Genes 
do not even make neural structures in any direct way, they produce proteins that affect 
cell differentiation to yield neurons that become specific types of neurons in specific 
places with particular connections with other neurons. 
(6) Developmental causation is not just "bottom up," but is also "top down." Genes are not 
the principal actors that produce traits (including behavioral traits), but are part of a 
complex system, in which the cytoplasm can influence the genes, extracellular hormones 
can influence the nucleus, external sensory stimulation can influence the genes, and the 
hormones can be influenced by the external environment. 
(7) The most accurate way to describe trait development is to use the "norm of reaction" 
approach which "is a list or graph of the correspondence between different possible 
environments and the phenotypes that would result", but this does not yield deterministic 
predictions. Even norms of reactions have to have a temporal developmental dimension 
added to them. 
(8) The classical ethology approach of Lorenz that distinguished between "learned" and 
"innate" behavior has to be replaced by an "interactionist," "epigenetic," "ecological,"  
or "life cycle" approach.   
(9) Classical behavioral genetics is also committed to a false nature-nurture dichotomy that 
mistakenly believes it can distinguish between the contributions of heredity and 
environment to behavior. 
(10) An analysis of variance is not the same thing as an analysis of causes. Because classical 
behavioral genetics is a population-based discipline with its main method being analysis 
of variance, it can say nothing about the causes of individual development. Classical 
behavioral genetics thus can only address the question "how much of the variance" is  
"attributable to heredity and how much to environment," but not "how" hereditary and 
environment actually produce their effects. 
(11) The concept of 'heritability' found at the core of classical behavioral genetics is 
generally useless and misleading: the nonadditivity of genetic effects will not permit its 
applicability except in highly specialized artificial circumstances. 
 
This is essentially the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES) position, and accords well with the 
view put in this paper, summarised in Figure 7. The overall process reflects Mayr’s “proximate/ 
ultimate causation” distinction (Mayr 1961, Laland et al 2011, Scholl and Pigliucci 2014, Pigliucci 
2016): physiological and developmental effects occur on the one hand, and evolutionary effects on the 
other, both being crucial to outcomes in biology (Noble 2013, 2017). 
 
6.2 The controversies 
 
Proposed views of the controversies listed in Section 1 are as follows: 
   
1. Drift/selection: The conflict between field biologists and physiologists (“functional biologists” or 
“evolutionary ecologists”) on the one hand, and those working in molecular evolution 
(“evolutionary biologists” or “population geneticists”) on the other (Mayr 1961, Birch 2016), with 
the latter (e.g. Lynch 2007) vehemently claiming that drift is almost always more important.  
 
The view here (\S 3.6) is that selection takes place at the or group phenotype level, and then that 
drives selection at genotype level – within an equivalence class. The genetic level is just one causal 
level in this integrated view (Noble 2012), The selection process may well not be easily apparent at 
the level of genes; that is because that is not the level where selection happens (Figures 2,4,6 and 7). 
Top-down processes (Campbell 1974, Murphy and Brrown 2005, Ellis 2016) are key to how this 
works, as emphasized by Noble (2017): 
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“Stochasticity is harnessed by organisms to generate functionality. Randomness does not, 
therefore, necessarily imply lack of function or ‘blind chance’ at higher levels. In this respect, 
biology must resemble physics in generating order from disorder. This fact is contrary to 
Schrödinger's idea of biology generating phenotypic order from molecular-level order, which 
inspired the central dogma of molecular biology. The order originates at higher levels, which 
constrain the components at lower levels. We now know that this includes the genome, which 
is controlled by patterns of transcription factors and various epigenetic and reorganization 
mechanisms. These processes can occur in response to environmental stress, so that the 
genome becomes ‘a highly sensitive organ of the cell’ (McClintock). …Blind chance is 
necessary, but the origin of functional variation is not at the molecular level.” 
 
That is the view of this paper.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: The full causal chain whereby selection leads to a new set of genes (yellow arrows), 
influenced by the environment (blue arrows), but omitting the epigenetic marks.   
 
 
2. The negative view of selection  
 
This is an issue of criteria for explanatory relevance (Pust 2001, Birch 2012), see \S3.5. Selection is 
not a negative process if one takes the whole dynamic process (Figures 2 and 7) into account. 
 
3. The Extended Evolutionary Synthesis versus Standard Evolutionary Theory  
 
The Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES: Pigliucci and Müller 2010, Laland et al 2015), which 
includes the Evo-Devo view (Carroll 2005, 2008, Gilbert and Epel 2009), emphasizes the interactions 
of developmental systems and physiology with evolutionary processes, and of evolutionary processes 
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on the environment (Laland et al 2000, Laland et al 2014). This leads to developmental bias, 
developmental plasticity, extra-genetic inheritance (particularly culture, allowing niche construction), 
and epigenetic marks. The basic view of the previous section as regards the overall dynamics of 
selection remains unchanged (\S4.4)  
 
What of the debate between Laland, Uller, et al (2014) proposing the EES should replace Standard 
Evolutionary Theory (SET), and Wray et al (2014) proposing the SET is just fine?  The key point here in the 
end is the SET is a gene-centric view of evolution (Wray et al 2014) whereas the EES is one where 
genes are just one actor among many (Laland, Uller, et al 2014, Noble 2012, Noble 2017).  Wray et 
al (2014) make the following core statement:  
 
Diluting what Laland and colleagues deride as a ‘gene-centric’ view would de-emphasize the 
most powerfully predictive, broadly applicable and empirically validated component of 
evolutionary theory. Changes in the hereditary material are an essential part of adaptation 
and speciation. The precise genetic basis for countless adaptations has been documented in 
detail, ranging from antibiotic resistance in bacteria to camouflage coloration in deer mice, 
to lactose tolerance in humans. 
 
In contrast, Laland, Uller, et al (2014) state  
 
In our view, this ‘gene-centric’ focus fails to capture the full gamut of processes that direct 
evolution. Missing pieces include how physical development influences the generation of 
variation (developmental bias); how the environment directly shapes organisms’ traits 
(plasticity); how organisms modify environments (niche construction); and how organisms 
transmit more than genes across generations (extra-genetic inheritance). For SET, these 
phenomena are just outcomes of evolution. For the EES, they are also causes. 
 
The EES view is supported by the view put here. Important as they are, genes are just one of the 
players in what is happening; and they are not at the level where selective outcomes are decided 
(Figures 2 to 7). They are enablers rather than drivers of evolution. 
 
4. The multilevel/kin selection debate  
 
This debate is tied in to the levels of selection issue (Lewontin 1970, Okasha 2006). Kin selection 
does indeed take place, but it takes place in a multilevel context, and it causal structure cannot be 
understood outside that context, see \S5.6 and Wade et al (2010), Kramer and Meunier (2016). 
Selection often takes place at the group level, and in particular this is crucial for many major 
evolutionary transitions (Calcott and Sterelny 2011:9), which could not occur otherwise. The situation 
is stated clearly by Sloan Wilson and Sober (1994), who state 
 
“We show that the rejection of group selection was based on a misplaced emphasis on genes 
as "replicators" which is in fact irrelevant to the question of whether groups can be like 
individuals in their functional organization. The fundamental question is whether social 
groups and other higher-level entities can be "vehicles" of selection. When this elementary 
fact is recognized, group selection emerges as an important force in nature and what seem to 
be competing theories, such as kin selection and reciprocity, reappear as special cases of 
group selection. The result is a unified theory of natural selection that operates on a nested 
hierarchy of units” 
 
Cohesive groups that can be objects of selection  
• Will not exist inter alia in the cases of bacteria, fungi (including yeast), worms (including c 
elegans), flies (including drosophila), bird flocks, and fish schools. In these cases, the whole 
is just the sum of its parts.  
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• May exist in the cases of wales, buffalo, lions, wild dogs, and similar species that hunt 
communally, as well as elephants and some of the great apes. The cases of birds and bats are 
unclear. 
• Clearly do exist in the case of ant colonies, eusocial insects (including bees) and animals 
(including naked mole rats), and social animals where a communal culture enhances survival 
prospects. The issue has to be decided on a case by case basis. But human beings are certainly 
amongst them.   
 
6.5  Overall 
 
The way adaptation is recognisable at higher levels is emphasize by Noble and Noble (2017), who 
state   
“The targeted mechanism in the immune system has been known and intensely studied for 
many years . So, how did many people not realise that it is a physiologically guided process? 
The answer is that the guidance does not lie at the genome level. At the genome level the 
process appears blind. It depends on stochastic mutation. The functionality enabling the 
process to be described as guided lies in the system as a whole” 
 
A multilevel-view, allowing for the effects of top-down causation as indicated in Figures 2, 4, and 7, 
can reconcile the views of the population geneticists and field biologists. The former see adaptive 
effects swamped by random genetic drift, the latter see clear evidence of organisms being adapted to 
their environment. The point is that selection does not take place at the genome level, and there is a 
vast equivalence class of genotypes that correspond to the same genotype: that is why the clear 
adaptive processes apparent at levels L2 and L3 can get hidden at level L1.  
 
Note that I have not claimed that rigorous evolutionary extremization principles exist for the 
situations considered here (cf. Metz et al 2008). Relative advantage as characterised by reproductive 
potential is what counts and leads to adaptive outcomes, as considered in studies such as those 
by Thygesen et al (2005) of optimal life histories for fishes or other animals in relation to the size 
spectrum of the ecological community in which they are both predators and prey. These studies are 
studies of the selective processes taking place at level L2 and their dependence on properties at level 
L3. They assume, as this paper does, that adaptation does indeed take place, and studies the details of 
how it takes place and what quantities get optimized. 
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